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Abstract  
Final goods producers, who may be intrinsically honest (a behavioral type) or 
opportunistic (strategic), play a repeated game of imperfect information with suppliers of 
an input of variable (and non-verifiable) quality.   Returns to cheating are increasing in 
the proportion of intrinsically honest producers. If producers compete for another scarce 
input, adverse selection reduces this proportion enough to enforce universal honesty, 
whether at a high or a low quality equilibrium.  This mechanism limits the proportion of 
behavioral types in the population of producers over a wide range of parameters: despite 
their inability to compete with opportunists, they are not wholly wiped out due to the 
strategic response of input suppliers.  Moreover, in equilibrium, opportunists must 
replicate the behavioral type’s behavior.  Thus competition curtails the presence of the 
behavioral type but increases the incidence if its behavior. If a labor market, where 
skilled and unskilled labor coexist,  is also endogenized, an honest equilibrium with both 
high and low quality will generally be reached;  however an exclusively high quality 
equilibrium with unemployment of unskilled labor is also possible. 
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1.  Introduction  
 Recent theory has been divided on the merits of continuing to assume that all 
economic agents are perfectly rational, where rationality is defined as following fully 
optimizing behavior.  Accordingly, there has been no dearth of studies modeling some 
form of bounded rationality.  In particular, two main alternatives to “strategic” or “fully 
optimizing” behavior were developed – evolutionary game theory and adaptive 
heuristics.  In the former, agents follow a fixed “outcome-independent” strategy : 
different proportions of agents in the population follow different strategies and evolution 
“selects” the best strategy – or set of strategies - over time, subject to “mutations” – 
random changes or transitions in the strategy followed.  In the latter, agents are not 
perfectly rational but may use a simple rule (for example, one based on regret matching – 
see Hart (2005)) to determine whether to switch to an alternative strategy. 
Our paper attempts to fill a gap in this literature by focusing on the interaction 
between strategic optimizing types and types following a behavioral rule, when both 
types belong to a class of agents playing a repeated game against agents of another class 
(who, for simplicity, are all assumed to be rational).  We apply our analysis to a problem 
of moral hazard between input suppliers, who supply inputs of variable but non-verifiable 
quality to final goods producers.  Transfer prices for the inputs may be determined 
through Nash bargaining, however, final producers have the option to cheat their 
suppliers by falsely claiming that the input they had been supplied was of low quality, 
thus paying a low price for a high-quality input.  The population of final producers is 
heterogeneous, with some intrinsically honest agents who always stick to honesty 
irrespective of economic considerations, and some opportunistic producers who are 
standard optimizing agents.  Matching is the result of a search process, but once a match 
is formed it can persist into future periods unless it is terminated either exogenously or 
deliberately.  We describe possible equilibria in three different models. All the models 
have the common feature that suppliers can supply inputs of high quality (using skilled 
labor at a wage ws) or low quality (using unskilled labor at a wage wu) to heterogeneous 
producers (either intrinsically honest or opportunistic) who transform these inputs into 
high or low quality products respectively which sell at prices PH and PL. 
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In our first model, we have exogenous wages and final prices, implying perfectly 
elastic supply of all primary factors and perfectly elastic demand for all final products, as 
in a small open economy (so that there is no competition between producers in the factor 
or product markets).    
In the second, wages and final prices are still exogenous, but production requires 
an additional factor, working capital, which is in inelastic supply and for which producers 
have to compete.  The element of competition introduces the interaction between strategic 
and behavioral agents, both of whom are playing against agents of another class.  
Interestingly this mechanism serves to limit the proportion of behavioral types in the 
population for a wide range of parameters.  The behavioral types’ strategy is inferior, in 
the relevant parameter space, and this leads to their downfall : however, the type is not 
entirely wiped out, and this is due to the strategic response of input suppliers – the other 
class of agents.  What is more, in contrast to the first model, equilibria in this model 
necessarily involve honesty – whether high or low quality is being supplied.  Thus, 
although the proportion of the behavioral type in the population goes down, their strategy 
is now followed by every one.  We therefore have a situation where, although “survival 
of the fittest” operates, the strategies followed by the unfit may prevail in equilibrium, 
due to the strategic interaction with other agents (input suppliers).  Incorporation of the 
channel of competition between producers changes behavior in equilibrium, and also 
rules out multiple equilibria obtaining for the same parameter ranges that characterized 
the first model – serving as an equilibrium selection device for the relevant range of 
parameters. 
In our third model, wages are endogenously determined by labor demand and 
inelastic supplies of each labor skill, though final product prices remain exogenous (as 
they would be in a small open economy).  In general, we can show that a single 
equilibrium obtains here where both high and low quality co-exist – with workers of both 
skill levels being employed – but in some circumstances (if exogenous separations of 
matches are very frequent, and agents are impatient) we may have an equilibrium in 
which there is involuntary unemployment of unskilled labor, with only high quality being 
supplied and produced in equilibrium. 
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Our paper thus relates to two of the three approaches in modeling agent behavior 
mentioned above – fully optimizing behavior and a behavioral genotype.  We do not deal 
with adaptive heuristics.  One strand of the related literature encompasses models of 
repeated moral hazard between fully optimizing players.  This is an extensive literature 
and the ideas underlying it date at least as far back as Williamson (1979) and Grossman 
and Hart (1986).  One or two-sided prisoner’s dilemma models with scope for cheating 
include those by Diamond (1991), Dixit (2003) and Greif (1993).  Often, prisoner’s 
dilemmas in large populations exhibit i.i.d random matching in such papers, in contrast to 
our approach of allowing for persistent relationships, though a relationship may be 
terminated either deliberately or due to exogenous reasons.  Papers such as Gul (2001) 
analyze hold-up problems and bargaining in a buyer-seller context, and this is also related 
to our model.   
Some papers (eg Dixit 2003) also contain some behavioral players in a two-sided 
prisoner’s dilemma.  However, there is no mechanism whereby the optimizing and the 
behavioral players belonging to the same class of agents compete : as such the second 
model in our paper, by introducing such a mechanism, lends itself to an evolutionary 
interpretation – the force behind selection being an economic one.  This brings us to 
another relevant strand of literature, that on evolutionary game theory.  Unlike standard 
evolutionary models we emphasize the effect of strategic or optimizing agents on 
behavioral types and on strategies that survive in a population.  Moreover, the 
mechanisms embedded in our second model as well as in our third model (which enables 
us to characterize conditions in the labor market in a general equilibrium setting and to 
predict in what circumstances involuntary unemployment of unskilled labor may emerge) 
serve as equilibrium selection devices eliminating the possibility of multiple equilibria 
for the same parameter values.  So this links our work to the literature on equilibrium 
selection (which includes Myerson (2004 ) ). 
 
2. Model I : Perfectly Elastic Factor Supplies 
2.1 Assumptions 
 
 We assume that suppliers can supply inputs of high quality (using skilled labor at 
a wage ws) or low quality (using unskilled labor at a wage wu) to heterogeneous 
 4
producers (either intrinsically honest or opportunistic) who transform these inputs into 
high or low quality products respectively which sell at prices PH and PL . 
 For the purposes of this first model, wages of both types of labor are exogenously 
fixed, all inputs are in perfectly elastic supply and hence there is no competition between 
producers in the factor market.  Throughout we assume that final good prices are 
exogenous as in a small open economy.  Moreover parameters are such that PH- ws> PL - 
wu so that the total surplus (to be shared among each matched supplier and producer) 
from high quality production is never lower than that associated with low quality 
production. 
 There are M suppliers and N producers where M and N are large numbers and 
M<N.  Of the N producers, a proportion α is intrinsically honest. 
 Each period one supplier can be matched with only one producer, and vice versa.  
Matching involves search by suppliers and producers who are on the market for new 
matches : however those whose previous match has not been either deliberately or 
exogenously terminated remain in the old relationship and do not enter the market.  A 
fraction 1-γ of all matches terminate exogenously (so that 1-γ is the probability of 
exogenous separation). 
 Our assumption regarding informational structure throughout is that instances of 
cheating are not public knowledge and are observed only by the cheated party. 
Once a match occurs, the matched supplier and producer decide on a contract.  
The non-verifiability of product quality makes any such contract incomplete.  However, 
contracts can be so designed as to make it feasible – though not necessarily profitable – 
for either the producer or the supplier to cheat.  If the producer has the option to decide 
on the price he will pay after inspecting the input, he is insured against being cheated, but 
has the opportunity himself of cheating by paying a low price for high quality. If he 
surrenders this option and agrees to pay a fixed pre-negotiated price, he cannot cheat and 
is vulnerable instead to cheating by the supplier, who could offer him low quality where 
the contract specifies high. Nor can the producer protect himself against cheating by 
threatening either to terminate the supply relationship or to pay a low price ever after.  
Such threats have no punitive value:  the dismissed supplier can enter the market 
masquerading as someone exogenously separated and secure a new match with 
 5
probability one.  Indeed, the supplier can himself dissolve the relationship to counter the 
low-price threat immediately after collecting the pre-negotiated price and move on to 
another “one-night stand”.  Since the producer anticipates this, such contracts, even if 
feasible, will never actually be concluded.  We can focus therefore exclusively on 
contracts where the producer has the right to decide whether to pay a high or a low price 
after receiving the supply.  
Apart from this angle, the contract must specify the transfer prices the supplier is 
to be paid for high and low quality inputs. These are denoted by pH and pL respectively. 
We assume Nash bargaining.  If the transfer prices are contingent on the quality that the 
producer claims to have received, they are not strictly implementable by law; however, 
though  input quality is non-verifiable, the transfer prices themselves as well as the fact of 
input delivery are all legally verifiable, therefore suppliers have to be paid a minimum of 
pL . If a producer cheats by making a false claim about input quality and accordingly 
paying a low price, the supplier can retaliate by supplying the opportunistic producer low 
quality ever after or even by deliberately terminating the relationship.  In the latter event, 
the producer has to search for a new partner.  He is not necessarily branded as a cheat by 
the mere fact of a severed relationship since there is a given probability 1-γ of an 
exogenous separation.  However, he faces an uncertain prospect q (which we endogenize) 
of finding a new match in the next period.  
The low quality price is determined with reference to the threat point of  no 
transaction (which yields a surplus of zero to each party).  The Nash product (PL – pL)(pL 
– wu) is maximized at pL = (PL + wu)/2.  If the producer claims to have received low 
quality, this is the price he must pay. 
The contract can be sustained by two threats, termination and low-quality supply.  
However, we need not consider the threat of low-quality supply and its impact on 
producer behavior.  If this is not as severe a threat as termination, a producer who can 
withstand the termination threat will automatically be able to withstand the low-quality 
threat as well.  If, on the other hand, low-quality supply reduces the producer’s income 
more than termination does, the producer, after cheating the supplier, can always dissolve 
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the partnership himself, thus rendering the low-quality threat irrelevant2. We shall 
determine the parameter range over which termination is an effective threat.  
Curiously however, in the parameter range where the contract is not 
implementable, it may yet be concluded between supplier and producer in full knowledge 
that it will not be generally implemented.  We then have a cheating equilibrium:  
suppliers provide high quality, are cheated by all opportunistic producers, whom they 
replace by a newcomer in every period;  however, the proportion of honest producers 
who pay the suppliers pH is high enough for the latter to persist with the provision of high 
quality. 
  
2.2 Timing 
 In the beginning of each period, suppliers and producers who are on the market 
for new matches search for a match, and if successful, enter into a relationship. Those not 
on the market continue with their previous relationships.  
Prior to production of the input, each matched agent bargains with his match, 
determining the transfer prices to be paid for high or low-quality inputs. Then matched 
suppliers supply either high or low quality (and hire skilled or unskilled labor 
accordingly). 
Each matched producer then takes possession of the input and decides what to pay 
on the basis of quality.  If a low quality input has been supplied, both honest and 
opportunistic producers pay  pL .  If the input was of high quality, opportunistic producers 
decide whether to deal honestly, paying  pH, or to cheat, paying pL : intrinsically honest 
producers pay pH. 
Depending on the actual quality of the input supplied, matched producers then 
produce a good of high or low quality.  At the end of the period, suppliers may choose to 
break off the relationship, in which case they and their separated partner both enter the 
market for new matches in the next period.  Or the match may terminate exogenously, in 
which case the same outcome ensues. If neither occurs, both parties continue with the 
relationship. The whole process is then repeated ad infinitum. 
                                                 
2 The payoff of a producer who has voluntarily terminated his partnership with a supplier is identical with 
that of one who has been punished by termination. 
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 2.3 Strategies and Equilibria 
  Quality-contingent Nash bargaining prices are determined assuming that in each 
match, a supplier and a producer equally divide the surplus (PH- ws) for high quality and 
(PL - wu ) for low.  Then the transfer prices are given by pH = 
2
H sP w+  and pL = 
2
L uP w+ .  
We note that pH > pL given the assumption that PH- ws> PL - wu . 
 In the one-stage game opportunistic producers have a clear incentive to cheat 
suppliers who supply them with a high quality input,  paying them only pL – thus 
appropriating cheating gains of pH-pL.   If all producers were opportunistic,  the suppliers’ 
best response would be to always supply low quality as this would give them a payoff of 
pL – wu  > pL – ws which they get from supplying high quality to producers who then 
cheat them.   However,  some producers (a fraction α) are honest in our framework and 
will pay pH if high quality is supplied.  Hence,  suppliers decide on what quality input to 
supply based on their expectation over types in the population (they cannot ex-ante 
distinguish opportunistic firms from honest ones) : they supply low quality iff 
( ) (1 )( )H s L s L up w p w p wα α− + − − < −  
or iff 
2( )
( )
s u s u
H L H L s u
w w w w
p p P P w w
α − −< =− − + −  
given the Nash-bargaining determined values of the transfer prices.   In this event they 
are always paid pL and opportunistic producers do not get a chance to cheat.   Otherwise,  
they supply high quality,  are cheated by opportunistic producers and are paid pH by 
honest producers. 
In the repeated game we allow for exogenous terminations and endogenize search 
probabilities. Note that uncertain search and exogenous terminations imply that merely 
observing that a producer’s previous matches had been terminated does not enable other 
potential suppliers to identify him as a cheat. 
Given our contract, only producers can cheat and the suppliers’ deterrent 
strategies involve punishing a producer who cheats either by deliberately terminating the 
relationship or by supplying low quality thereafter as long as the relationship lasts.   We 
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examine the parameter ranges in which either of these threats enforces a high-quality 
honest equilibrium.  We then go on to describe two other kinds of equilibria that could 
exist, depending on the parameter values.  For some parameters multiple equilibria may 
exist.  
(1) A high-quality honest equilibrium : Every period,  matches occur between suppliers 
and producers who are both on the market.   Let qH be the probability of a producer on 
the market finding a match in an honest equilibrium. Once a match is formed it persists 
unless it terminates exogenously.  There is no cheating and therefore no punitive 
separations.    The number of earlier matches persisting into any given period is equal to : 
M –(1 – γ)M = γM                                                    (1) 
As suppliers constitute the short side of the market,  all M suppliers can find matches but 
of these matches a fraction 1 – γ terminate in each period,  as indicated above.   Therefore 
the number of producers on the market equals the total number of producers N,  less the 
ones in matches that persist from earlier periods : or 
N – γM                                                                        (2) 
while by a similar argument the number of suppliers on the market is  
        M – γM                                                                         (3) 
From (2) and (3),  the probability of a producer on the market finding a match is: 
(1 )
H
Mq
N M
γ
γ
−= −                                                           (4) 
This endogenizes q in an honest equilibrium.  qH is evidently decreasing in γ.  
Equivalently, it is increasing in the probability of exogenous separation. 
What conditions support an honest equilibrium?  Recall that the effective off-
equilibrium threat is for a cheated supplier to terminate his relationship with the cheat.   
This threat is costless for the supplier,  as next period he is sure to find another match,  
from whom he can expect a strictly higher payoff than from the cheat (even if other 
opportunists also wanted to cheat,  there is some probability that the new match will be 
an intrinsically honest type).   When will this threat be effective in deterring deviations by 
producers?  Let VH be the lifetime expected payoff of a matched producer in an honest 
high-quality equilibrium,  and let VHU be the payoff of an unmatched producer in this 
equilibrium.  Then  
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VH = (PH – pH) + δ{γVH + (1 – γ)VHU}                                     (5) 
The first bracketed term denotes the producer’s payoff from acting honestly in his current 
match,  while the term in braces shows that if the match terminates exogenously (with 
probability (1- γ)) the producer gets the payoff of an unmatched producer,  otherwise he 
continues to get the payoff of a matched producer : his future expectation is discounted 
by the discount factor δ.   Now a producer whose match terminates exogenously finds a 
new match with probability qH,  where qH is given by (4) : otherwise,  his 
“unemployment” persists into the next period.  Thus,  we have 
VHU = qHVH + (1 –qH)δVHU
Or 
VHU = 
1 (1 )
H
H
q
qδ− − VH                                               (6) 
Substituting (6) in (5) and simplifying, 
VH = 
1 (1 )( )
(1 )(1 (1 )
H
H H
H
qP p
q
δ
δ δγ
− −− − − −                                         (7) 
Let VD be the payoff to a deviant producer in this equilibrium.  A deviant cheats and gets 
PH-pL,  but then the cheated supplier terminates the relationship.  After this,  the deviant 
would have to search for a new match.  So 
VD = PH – pL + δqH Max(VD,VH)[1 + δ(1 – qH) + δ2(1 – qH)2 +..] 
= PH-pL +
1 (1 )
H
H
q
q
δ
δ− −  Max(VD, VH)                                         (8) 
The condition to rule out deviations is that 
VD< VH
In this case, 
VD = PH – pL+ 
1 (1
H
H
q
q )
δ
δ− − VH < VH
Or 
VH > [PH – pL]
1 (1 )
1
Hqδ
δ
− −
−                                    (9) 
Equivalently,  from (7) and (9), 
PH – pH  > [PH – pL]{1 – δγ(1 – qH)}                                    (10) 
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  We have already argued that the threat of perpetual low-quality supply has no 
independent force since the producer can circumvent it by dissolving the relationship 
himself. 
An honest equilibrium is thus ensured in the parameter range (10). 
Now we focus on the termination threat and turn to the description of other 
possible equilibria3.  This leads us to : 
 
(2) A “high quality cheating equilibrium”:  This is an equilibrium where suppliers 
always supply high quality but are paid the low price pL by all opportunistic types in spite 
of the termination threat4.  What are the conditions required to support such an 
equilibrium? 
We first examine the conditions that make it optimal for opportunistic producers 
to always cheat when supplied with high quality (if they are supplied low quality,  then of 
course they have no opportunity to cheat).  Suppose we are in an equilibrium where high 
quality is being supplied and opportunistic producers are always cheating.  Then in each 
match, they make PH – pL – each instance of cheating is followed by immediate 
termination of the relationship,  followed by renewed cheating if and when a new match 
is found.   The number of matches from earlier periods persisting into the current period 
is : 
M – (1-γ)M – γ(1-α)M = αγM                              (11) 
The third term being subtracted denotes the matches that   were deliberately terminated 
because the suppliers in question were cheated by opportunistic producers.   Therefore,  
the number of suppliers on the market is  
M(1-αγ)                                                              (12) 
While the number of producers on the market is N minus the number in matches 
persisting from earlier periods, or 
                                                 
3 Reversion to supplying low quality forever in a repeated relationship is essentially the trigger strategy of 
resorting to the one-shot Nash equilibrium in a two player game. We wish to focus on the richness added to 
the model as a result of allowing for multiple suppliers and producers and uncertain search.  As we shall 
show shortly, supplying low quality is the equilibrium strategy for some parameter ranges even when a 
termination threat constitutes the off-equilibrium punishment for cheating – however, for other parameter 
values, high quality may be supplied. 
4 Of course, intrinsically honest producers never cheat their suppliers. 
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N- αγM                                                             (13) 
So the probability of a producer on the market finding a match in this cheating 
equilibrium is 
qc = 
(1 )M
N M
αγ
αγ
−
−                                                            (14) 
We note that qc > qH.   Because of the greater number of terminations in a cheating 
equilibrium,  there are more suppliers on the market and this makes it easier for a 
producer whose relationship has terminated to find a new match. 
 
  Denoting the opportunist’s payoff to following a cheating strategy by Vc, 
Vc = [PH – pL][1 + δqc + δ2qc + ...]  
= [PH – pL][1 + 
1
cqδ
δ− ]  
= [PH – pL][
1 (1 )
1
cqδ
δ
− −
− ]                                                (15) 
For opportunistic producers to have no incentive to deviate from this strategy,  we require 
Vc to exceed VDc, which denotes the payoff of a deviant in a cheating equilibrium.  A 
one-time deviation consists of paying pH for high quality,  so that barring exogenous 
terminations,  the relationship persists.   Thus we require: 
VDc = PH – pH + δγ Vc + δ(1 – γ)qcVc [1 + (1 – qc)δ + (1 – qc)2δ2 +..] < Vc
Or 
VDc = PH – pH + δγ Vc + qcVc
(1 )
1 (1 cq )
δ γ
δ
−
− −  <Vc
Simplifying,  this gives us: 
[PH – pH]
1 (1 )
(1 )(1 (1 ))
c
c
q
q
δ
δ δγ
− −
− − −  <Vc
or from (15), 
PH – pH <[PH – pL]{1-δγ(1-qc)}                              (16) 
(16) is the condition supporting a high quality cheating equilibrium on the producers’ 
side.    
When will suppliers support this equilibrium by supplying high quality in spite of 
the knowledge that all opportunistic producers might cheat ?     The suppliers’ choice of 
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move depends on their expectation over intrinsically honest and opportunistic types : if α,  
the proportion of intrinsically honest types,  is above a threshold α* they may choose to 
supply high quality,  correctly anticipating that the probability of encountering a cheat is 
low.   We prove in the appendix that this threshold is given by 
α * = 2( )1 (( ) ( ) {
1 1
s u
L u
H s L s
w w
p wp w p wγ δγ δδγ δ δ
1 ) }
1
γ
−
−− −− − − + − +− − −
                (17) 
Thus,  when opportunists have no incentive to deviate from cheating if supplied with high 
quality,   the supplier supplies high quality if and only if the fraction of intrinsically 
honest producers is high enough, i.e when: 
α > α *                                                      (18) 
Both (16) and (18) must hold for a “high quality cheating equilibrium” to be supported.   
A third alternative is : 
 
(3) The low quality equilibrium : If (18) does not hold,  but (16) does,  suppliers have a 
higher expected payoff from supplying low quality than from high quality – knowing that 
if they supplied high quality,  all opportunistic producers would have an incentive to 
cheat them.   Thus in this case all suppliers supply low quality and opportunistic 
producers have no opportunity to cheat.   The conditions supporting this equilibrium are 
(16) and  
α < α *                                                 (19) 
 Obviously, the same parameter values cannot support both a low quality 
equilibrium and a  high quality cheating equilibrium,  as conditions (18) and (19) are 
obverses of each other.   Comparing conditions (16) and (10),  and noting that qc > qH,  
we see that if (16) does not hold,  then (10) automatically does.   In other words,  if a 
cheating equilibrium is impossible to sustain, an honest equilibrium is always possible.   
This is not surprising when we consider that the penalty for a deviation in an honest 
equilibrium is a period of uncertain search after being fired by the cheated supplier and 
that the probability of being successful in this search is even lower in an honest 
equilibrium than in a cheating equilibrium.   If, on the other hand,  (10) does not hold,  so 
that an honest equilibrium is not sustainable using the termination threat,  (16) 
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automatically holds and a cheating equilibrium can exist provided α is high enough to 
induce suppliers to supply high quality.   If the danger of uncertain search is insufficient 
to deter deviations from an honest equilibrium, the probability of a cheat’s being able to 
find a match is certainly high enough to support cheating behavior when all other 
opportunists are cheating and there are many more suppliers on the market.    
There is also a range where it is possible for both (10) and (16) to hold.   This is a 
range of parameter values for which multiple equilibria are possible.   If opportunists 
thought that all other opportunists would be honest,  no single one of them would have an 
incentive for a profitable deviation – yet cheating might be profitable if all other 
opportunists were cheating  too.   In this range co-ordination would determine which 
particular equilibrium would obtain.   If α < α*,  suppliers might decide to supply low 
quality from the outset,  if they thought opportunistic producers were likely to co-ordinate 
on a cheating equilibrium in the event of being supplied with high quality.   If α > α*,  
however,  high quality would be supplied and then either an honest or a cheating 
equilibrium is possible.   
 
 We can summarize equilibrium strategies in our first model thus: 
1.The suppliers’ first move : If (16) does not hold – and by implication (10) does – then 
suppliers supply high quality.   If (16) holds,  then suppliers supply high quality if α > α * 
and low quality otherwise. 
2.The producers’ first move : If (16) does not hold – and (10) does – then all producers 
pay the suppliers pH for the high quality input.   If (16) holds, and (10) does not,  
opportunistic producers pay suppliers pL whether supplied with high or low quality : 
intrinsically honest producers pay pH for high and pL for low quality.  If both (16) and 
(10) hold,  and suppliers provide low quality,  all producers pay pL,  while if suppliers 
provide high quality,  either of two equilibria could result : in one,  all producers pay pH : 
in the other,  only intrinsically honest producers do so while all opportunists pay pL. 
3.The suppliers’ second move : If paid pH for high quality or pL for low quality,  suppliers 
continue their relationship with their match : otherwise,  if paid pL for high quality,  they 
terminate it.  They then repeat their first move – if necessary,  with new producers. 
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4.  The producers’ second move : Producers continue in their old relationship unless it 
terminates and search for a new match if it does.   They then repeat their first move with 
old partners or any new matches : and if unmatched,  they continue their search. 
 
In terms of the parameters PH – pH, PH –  pL ,  we have the following possibilities: 
1.PH – pH > (PH – pL)[1 – δγ(1 – qc)] > (PH – pL)[1 – δγ(1 – qH)]:  the region of high-
quality honest equilibrium. 
2.PH – pH < (PH – pL)[1 – δγ(1 – qH)] < (PH – pL)[1 – δγ(1 – qc)]  and α < α*:  the region 
of low-quality honest equilibrium. 
3.PH – pH < (PH – pL)[1 – δγ(1 – qH)] < (PH – pL)[1 – δγ(1 – qc)]   and α > α*:  the region 
of cheating equilibrium. 
4.(PH – pL)[1 – δγ(1 – qc)] > PH – pH > (PH – pL) [1 – δγ(1 – qH)] :  the region of multiple 
equilibria.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
An implication of this analysis is that opportunities for cheating are an increasing – albeit 
discontinuously increasing – function of the level of honesty of the population of 
producers.  Cheating can prevail only if α exceeds a threshold :  with fewer honest 
producers, suppliers will be disinclined to supply high quality, so that the larger number 
of opportunists will be denied any scope for cheating. 
 
3. Model 2 : Competition, Adverse Selection and Effects on Evolution 
3.1 The Mechanism 
In this model,  wages and product prices are still exogenous.  However,  there is 
one factor, capital,  which is in inelastic supply : there is competition for this in the factor 
markets.   Each unit of output has a fixed capital requirement of one unit in addition to its 
intermediate input requirement.   Let r stand for the opportunity cost of this capital.  This 
alters the Nash-bargaining determined expressions for the transfer prices to pH = ½[PH – r 
+ ws] and   pL = ½[PL – r + wu] .   The analysis parallels that in the first model and we 
have parallels to conditions (10) and (16) : 
PH – r – pH > [PH – r – pL]{1-δγ(1-qH)}                               (10’) 
     and 
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PH – r – pH < [PH – r – pL]{1-δγ(1-qc)}                                   (16’) 
Conditions (18) and (19) remain as before as does the threshold α *. 
 
 Let us consider a situation where  PH – r –  pH < (PH – r – pL)[1 – δγ(1 – qH)] < (PH 
– r – pL)[1 – δγ(1 – qc)] and α >α *.   Comparing this to the account of the equilibrium 
strategies in model 1,  we see that by cheating,  opportunistic producers would earn 
profits of [PH – r – pL]
1 (1
1
cq )δ
δ
− −
−  while intrinsically honest producers would earn  
 [PH – r – pH]
1 (1 )
(1 )(1 (1 ))
c
c
q
q
δ
δ δγ
− −
− − −
5.   We can instantly see from the fact that condition 
(16’) holds that opportunistic firms are making strictly higher profits as long as they 
continue to pay investors the same r that honest firms are paying.   Let us assume that 
honest firms are paying the maximum rate of return,  r ,  needed to equate their profits to 
their opportunity cost.   Then, if we assume that honest and opportunistic firms have the 
same opportunity costs (perhaps because there are no profitable opportunities for   
cheating outside the industry), opportunistic firms can offer a return up to r  > r  where  
H
O H
PH – rH –  pH = [PH – rO –  pL]{1-δγ(1-qc)}                                 (20) 
The supply of funds being inelastic,  firms offering a higher r succeed in attracting all the 
capital.  This is not only feasible, but also profitable for the firm, since its stock of capital 
is the only constraint on its output and profits.   Thus,  opportunistic firms can drive the 
less profitable honest firms out of  business.  But then no equilibrium is possible with α > 
α * - as long as the proportion of intrinsically honest firms is higher than this, honest 
firms will continue to be driven out of business by competition with opportunists who are 
able to earn higher profits as a consequence of cheating.  Therefore, in equilibrium α 
cannot exceed α * and will be driven down to this proportion if it was initially higher. If, 
however, α ≤ α * to start with, suppliers would offer low quality, opportunists would have 
no opportunities for cheating;  they would be forced willy-nilly to behave like honest 
firms and would not therefore be able to lure away capital from the latter by offering 
higher returns. 
                                                 
5 This is like the VH producers earn in an honest equilibrium,  except that the relevant q is now higher – qc, 
not qH,  as we are in a cheating equilibrium. 
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 On the other hand,  if (PH – r – pL)[1 – δγ(1 – qH)] < PH – r –  pH < (PH – r – pL)[1 
– δγ(1 – qc)], we are in the region corresponding to the “multiple equilibria” region of 
Model 1 : suppliers would supply high quality,  and opportunists would cheat or act 
honest according to whether they expect other opportunists to cheat or act honest.  If they 
all act honest, all producers would make the same profits, so there would be no 
destructive competition of the kind outlined above.  If, however, they coordinate on a 
cheating equilibrium, the opportunists would make a higher rate of profit than honest 
producers if they pay the same r on their capital as the latter.  They would then have the 
incentive and the ability to raise their r above the maximum that the honest firm could 
pay.  Suppliers, knowing this, realize that the fraction of intrinsically honest producers 
would be driven down to α* and so would only supply low quality, and producers would 
accordingly be unable to cheat.  This may in fact wipe out the multiplicity of equilibria as 
suppliers, knowing that producers have an incentive to cheat, and also knowing that α 
cannot exceed α* in equilibrium, supply low quality as long as PH – r –  pH < (PH – r – 
pL)[1 – δγ(1 – qc)].  This perforce results in a low quality equilibrium without cheating.  
The motivation to supply high quality when cheating is possible is eliminated as the 
proportion of intrinsically honest producers in equilibrium is no longer high enough.  
This underscores the potential of the element of competition between producers for 
capital to serve as a co-ordination device in the region of multiple equilibria.  
Finally, if PH – r –  pH > (PH – r – pL)[1 – δγ(1 – qC)] > (PH – r – pL)[1 – δγ(1 – 
qH)], a high quality honest equilibrium is assured. 
Thus in our second model,  only two possible equilibria remain.  If PH – r –  pH > 
(PH – r – pL)[1 – δγ(1 – qC)] > (PH – r – pL)[1 – δγ(1 – qH)], there is a high quality honest 
equilibrium.6  Otherwise, a low quality equilibrium obtains,  because even if the 
proportion of intrinsically honest types started out high enough to induce suppliers to 
supply high quality regardless of (16’) holding,  competition would drive out enough 
honest types to induce suppliers to supply low quality instead.   Thus the market 
mechanism of competition for capital drives out honest types and thereby eliminates 
actual cheating behavior.  As long as (16’) holds,  opportunistic producers continue to 
                                                 
6 Note that the equilibrium probabilities of successful search may differ slightly from Model 1 because 
some intrinsically honest producers leave the market in some parameter ranges. This does not make a 
qualitative difference : the probabilities in Model 2 are derived in the appendix. 
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have an incentive to cheat; unfortunately for them, they get no opportunity to do so.  
Adverse selection actually enforces an honest equilibrium. 
 
 
3.2 Discussion 
 While this model thus compels honesty in equilibrium, in a wide range of 
parameters (those where (16’) holds) it also sets an upper limit to the proportion of 
intrinsically honest producers who can survive in the market.  This limit is determined 
endogenously by market parameters unrelated to the level of natural honesty of the 
population of producers.  In equilibrium, cheating is never observed, yet honesty is not 
necessarily the best policy out of equilibrium. 
Another counterintuitive aspect of this model is that expectations here have a self-
defeating, rather than a self-fulfilling, quality.  If suppliers expect to encounter more 
dishonesty among producers, this may well rule out dishonest behavior altogether.  The 
reason is that it induces suppliers to take defensive precautions so strong that producers 
cannot cheat, much though they may want to. 
While our first model was of a repeated game being played between two classes 
of agents, where one class was heterogeneous in comprising of both “strategic” players 
(opportunistic producers) as well as “behavioral players” (intrinsically honest ones), our 
second model has gone beyond this to introduce a channel of competition within the same 
class of agents, so that players following behavioral rules have to interact with those 
following optimizing strategies, while both at the same time are playing a game against 
another class of strategic agents – input suppliers.  A purely economic channel serves to 
drive out some behavioral players in parameter ranges where their behavioral rule is an 
“unfit” or unprofitable strategy.  This may be regarded as a type of selection determining 
long run survival.  There are a couple of twists to this evolutionary story7.  The strategic 
response of the other class of agents – input suppliers – limits the extent to which the 
selection process can go : once there are few enough behavioral types in the population of 
producers, suppliers change their behavior by supplying only low quality inputs so that 
                                                 
7 The rest of this paragraph refers to the case where (16’) holds so that selection through competition is not 
a moot issue. 
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all producers now make the same profits and weeding out of behavioral types stops.  
Secondly, while unfit players (or some of them) are weeded out during selection : the 
strategy followed by these unfit players grows in importance in the sense that every one 
is now honest in equilibrium.  This result contrasts with the traditional wisdom in 
evolutionary games where the survival of a strategy followed by a type in the population 
is more or less equated to the survival of the type.  Our result differs due to the strategic 
responses of input suppliers who change their behavior so as to eliminate opportunities 
for cheating.  In other words, their response alters the environment so that the strategy 
followed by the “unfit” players becomes the only feasible one.     
 
4. Model 3 : Endogenous Wages 
 
In this model,  we use a general equilibrium framework to endogenize wages of 
skilled and unskilled labor (assumed to be elastically supplied at given wages in the first 
two models).  Here, labor types of different skills are in inelastic supply and their wages 
are solely determined by demand.  However,  product prices PH and PL still remain 
exogenous,  as in a small open economy. 
 Model 2 shows that competition for capital reduces the proportion of honest 
producers to a level where no opportunities for cheating remain.  We either have a high-
quality honest equilibrium or a low quality equilibrium. 
 However, if both skilled and unskilled labor exist in the economy, neither of these 
two options will be compatible with a full-employment labor market equilibrium.  Excess 
supply of one kind of labor or another can be avoided only if both high and low quality 
coexist.  Labor market equilibrium requires that 
1. suppliers should be indifferent between supplying high and low quality; 
2. the quality composition of supply should correspond to the skill composition of 
labor;  
3. producers who receive high quality supply should pay the high price and those 
who receive low quality supply should pay the low price. 
Conditions 1 and 3 imply that  
pH – ws = pL – wu. 
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Condition 3 further implies that the producer’s payoff from honesty should equal or 
exceed that from cheating.  Let Vh be  the payoff of the producer who receives high 
quality and pays a high price and Vl be the payoff of the producer who receives low 
quality and pays a low price.  Also let Vu be the payoff of a producer who is currently 
unmatched and V be the prior expectation of return to the producer who has been 
matched but has not yet received any supply.  Then 
Vh = PH – r – ph + δ{γVh + (1 – γ)Vu} 
Vl = PL – r – pl + δ{γVl + (1 – γ)Vu} 
Vu = δ{qV + (1 – q)Vu}. 
From these, we have 
Vh = 
(1 )
1
H H uP r p Vδ γ
δγ
− − + −
−  
Vl = 
(1 )
1
L LP r p Vuδ γ
δγ
− − + −
−  
Vu = 1 (1
q
q)
δ
δ− − V 
Further, in equilibrium, the producer correctly expects the quality of supply to reflect that 
of labor skills;  thus, the probability of high quality supply corresponds to the proportion 
(say λ) of skilled labor and 
V = λVh + (1 – λ)Vl. 
 In this scenario, producers can cheat only by paying a low price for high quality, 
whereupon the supplier terminates the relationship and the producer has to search for a 
new match.  The payoff to a one-period deviation of this kind is 
Vd = PH – r – pL + δVu. 
We require  
Vh ≥ Vd. 
 
We can find what this implies in terms of the input and output prices, combine the 
findings with the condition for suppliers to be indifferent between supplying high quality 
and low quality and use the Nash bargaining condition for determination of transfer 
prices to derive labor market equilibrium values for skilled and unskilled wages.  If these 
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values are positive, such an equilibrium exists where labor of both skill levels is 
employed.  We do this calculation in the appendix to show that under certain conditions, 
unskilled wages – and therefore skilled wages as well – can indeed be positive.  
However, this is by no means a certainty. 
 
 Thus in general equilibrium,  adjustments in the labor market will change wages 
and transfer prices in such a way that we are at the border between a high quality honest 
equilibrium and a low quality one :  in fact, both high and low quality will in general co-
exist in equilibrium, as long as labor of both kinds exists in the economy, unless of course 
the equilibrium wage for unskilled labor is negative – or, as may be easily generalized, 
below a minimum subsistence requirement.   In the latter case, the model will generate 
unemployment.  From our calculations in the appendix it is easy to show that 
unemployment of unskilled labor becomes likely if the probability of exogenous 
separations is very high or if agents are very impatient, as in these circumstances the 
unskilled labor wage consistent with employment of both types of labor in general 
equilibrium becomes too low to be feasible (in this case, negative). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 We have applied three models to the analysis of repeated interactions between 
homogeneous (optimizing) input suppliers and heterogeneous final goods producers (who 
can be either optimizing, or can follow the behavioral rule of always being honest) where 
input quality is non-verifiable, producers face uncertain search and deliberate termination 
of a match constitutes the main threat against cheating.  There is absence of collective 
information or memory about cheating.  Unlike many other papers, we do not consider 
random i.i.d matches every period, but allow relationships to persist in the absence of 
exogenous separation or deliberate termination.  In our first model, all factors are in 
elastic supply and wages and product prices are exogenous : we characterize conditions 
supporting (a) a high-quality honest equilibrium, (b) a high-quality equilibrium where 
opportunists cheat, (c) a low-quality equilibrium, and (d) a region of multiple equilibria.  
We show that returns to cheating are increasing in the proportion of behavioral players in 
the population of producers.  In our second model, we introduce competition between 
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producers for an inelastic factor, working capital.  We show that in many parameter 
ranges this generates adverse selection, eliminating some (but not all) behavioral players 
– but while limiting the proportion of intrinsically honest players, the strategic response 
of input suppliers ensures that universal honesty is enforced.  This provides an example 
of what happens when strategic and behavioral players belonging to the same class of 
agents compete while simultaneously playing a game against another class of agents.  
While some “unfit” players may be weeded out, the strategy of these unfit players 
becomes universally prevalent owing to the strategic response of the other class of agents.  
This response also limits the extent to which “selection” is allowed to operate : not all 
behavioral types are eliminated.  We also argued that the presence of this channel of 
competition could serve as an equilibrium selection device eliminating the multiplicity of 
equilibria which obtained for some parameter ranges in the first model.  In the second 
model, cheating never takes place in equilibrium, and we have either a high quality 
honest equilibrium or one with low quality.  In our third model, we endogenize wages of 
skilled and unskilled labor whose supply we assume to be inelastic so that the wages are 
demand-determined.  We showed that in general both types of labor are employed in 
general equilibrium which constitutes a border between high and low quality equilibria – 
both high and low quality are supplied and produced in equilibrium and there is no 
cheating.  However, if exogenous separation is likely or if agents are impatient, it is 
possible to have involuntary unemployment of unskilled labor in general equilibrium so 
that high quality alone is produced and only skilled labor is employed. 
 
Appendix A : Calculation of the threshold α* 
Given that opportunistic producers have an incentive to cheat (i.e, (16) holds), when 
suppliers observe producers on the market,  the conditional probability they assign to 
such a producer’s honesty is given by (1 )
1
α γ
αγ
−
− .   The numerator shows the probability 
that the producer is an honest type whose match terminated exogenously (all producers 
whose matches were deliberately terminated are of course opportunistic).   The 
denominator shows the probability of a producer’s being on the market.   Now we denote 
by V(HQ) the supplier’s payoff to following the strategy of offering high quality: 
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(1 ) (1 ) 1( ) [ ( )] [ ( )]
1 1 1 1
H s
L s
p wV HQ V HQ p w V HQα γ δ γ α δαγ δγ δ αγ
−− − −= + + − +− − − −  
 
 = 2
(1 )( )1[ ][
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) 1
H s
L s
p w (1 )( ]p wα γδ ααγ δ αδ γ δ α δ δγ
− −− + − −− − − − − − − −  
                                                                                                                                      
By offering low quality,  on the other hand,  suppliers get: 
V(LQ) = (1 )
1 1 1
L u L up w p wδ γ
δγ δ
− −−+− − −δγ   
where the first term simply shows that the supplier gets the low quality payoff if the 
match does not break off exogenously,  and the second term shows that if the match 
breaks off exogenously in any future period,  the supplier again gets the low quality 
payoff in a new match.   This simplifies to  
V(LQ) =  
1
L up w
δ
−
−                                                                                    
  Thus whenever (18) holds,  a supplier supplies high quality if and only if V(HQ) 
exceeds V(LQ).   This happens for a threshold level of α given by  
α * = 2( )1 (( ) ( ) {
1 1
s u
L u
H s L s
w w
p wp w p wγ δγ δδγ δ δ
1 ) }
1
γ
−
−− −− − − + − +− − −
                                  (19) 
 
Appendix B : Equilibrium probability of successful search in Model 2 
In our second model, some intrinsically honest producers may leave the market in case α 
started out being higher than *α  and if parameters were such that opportunistic 
producers had an incentive to cheat.  In this case, let d be the number of honest producers 
who “die” or leave the market as a result of competition. Now d solves 
*N d
N d
α α− =−  
where N was the initial number of producers, and α the initial fraction of intrinsically 
honest producers.  Then in equilibrium, where we necessarily have honesty, the relevant 
probability of successful search is now given by 
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(1 )
H
Mq
N d M
γ
γ
−= − −  
However, if α started out being lower than *α , no “deaths” owing to competition take 
place and the probability of successful search remains the same as the Hq  of Model 1.  
The same is true if parameters are such that a high quality honest equilibrium is sure to 
obtain and no one has an incentive to cheat – as there is no destructive competition in this 
case either. 
 
 
Appendix C : Derivation of Wages Consistent with General Equilibrium (Model 3) 
with both types of labor being employed  
We write Ph for PH – r  and Pl for PL – r in order to slightly simplify the notation.  For 
opportunistic producers not to want to cheat when supplied high quality, we require 
(1 )
1
h H U
h d
P p VV V Ph L Up V
δ γ δδγ
− + −= ≥ = −− +
L
 
Simplifying, this amounts to 
( ) (1 )h L U HP p V p pδγ δγ δ− ≥ − + −  
Substituting for the transfer prices, using 
,
2 2
h s l
H L
P w P wp p u+ += =  
we get 
( ) (( ) (1 )
2 2 2
l u h l s u
h U
P w P P w wP Vδγ δγ δ )− + −− − ≥ − +                 (A1) 
But we also have 
H s L up w p w− = −  
Or 
2 2
h s l uP w P w− −=  
h l sP P w w⇒ − = − u .                                                            (A2) 
Also 
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2 2
h s l u
h H l
P w P wP p P pL
− −− = = = −                                (A3) 
From (A2), 
.( ) (1 )2 2
l u
h
P wP Vδγ δγ δ− − ≥ − + −U h lP P                                     (A4) 
From (A3), 
.h lV V V= =  
So 
{( ) / 2} (1 )[ ]
1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1
h h s
U
qV P w VqV
q q
Uδ δ γδ
δ δ δγ
− + −= =− − − − −  
or 
(
(1 )(1 ) 2
h s
U
P wqV
q
)δδ δ δγ
−= − + −                               (A5) 
From (A4), (A5) and (A2), 
2 ( )( )
2 2 2[1 ]
l u l u
h h
P w q P wP P
q
δ γδγ δ δγ
−− − ≥ + −+ − lP  
Solving, 
2 2 2 2 2 2[2 2 3 2 ] [2 2 4 2 2 ]
(1 )
l h
u
q q P q qw δ δγ δ γ δ γ δ δγ δ γ δ γδγ δγ
+ − − + − + − − +≤ −
P  
wu can be positive only if the right hand side of the above inequality is positive.  This 
requires that 
Pl
2(1 )qδ δγ
δγ
+ − – Ph 2(1 ) 2qδ δγδγ
+ − > 0 
Or Pl/Ph > 
2(1 ) 2
2(1 )
q
q
δ δγ
δ δγ
+ −
+ − = 1 – 2(1 )q
δγ
δ δγ+ − . 
The right hand side of this inequality is decreasing in δ and γ and increasing in q.  For a 
given configuration of product prices, a positive wu is likelier the lower the exogenous 
separation probability and the lower the discount rate and the prospect of finding a new 
match in the next period (the latter being in turn an increasing function of the separation 
probability).  A positive wu in equilibrium implies of course full employment of 
unskilled, as well as skilled, labor.  Conversely an equilibrium with involuntary 
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unemployment of unskilled labor is more likely if the probability of exogenous separation 
is very high or if agents are very impatient. 
s u hw w P Pl= + −  
or  
2 2 2 2 2 2[2 2 4 2 2 ] [2 2 5 2 3 ]
(1 )
l h
s
q q P q qw δ δγ δ γ δ γ δ δγ δ γ δ γδγ δγ
+ − − + − + − − +≤ −
P  
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